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THE WARREN COURT AND THE

POLITICAL PROCESS
William M. Beaney*

I.

THE COURT BEFORE WARREN

complex political system creates endless opportunity to
debate the proper roles and powers of each of our principal
political institutions. Students of the Supreme Court who quarrel
over the proper role of the Court sometimes forget that the powers
of the President and the proper place of Congress have also been
subject to fierce controversy throughout our history, and that the
political tension between the national government and the states
has provided a persistent theme from the beginning of the Republic.
It must never be forgotten that the system provided by the Framers
was not designed to produce efficient government, but rather was
intended, through the positing of power against power, to create a
"free" government, one in which property and the other minority
rights might be reasonably secure against the weight of popular
majorities. Yet, they did not-and in the nature of things they could
not-set forth a detailed permanent model, one in which the role of
each of our great political institutions was rigorously defined for all
times. James Madison, speculating about the probable strength of
each of the three branches of the new government, gave the palm to
the legislature, which, in his judgment, tended to draw "all power
into its impetuous vortex." 1 His fellow. commentator, Hamilton,
awarded third place to the Supreme Court, "beyond comparison
the weakest of the three." 2 The relatiorrship benveen national and
state governments conceived by Madison envisaged the popular and
powerful states as fully' capable of resisting national power; thus,
the task of the newly established national government was to attract
sufficient support to enable it to serve as a countenveight to the
divisive tendencies of the states.3
In tracing historically the relationships of each branch of the
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national government to the others, one notes both long-term and
,short-term changes in the relative power of each. Certain Presidents,
notably Jackson and Lincoln, expanded presidential power during a
century marked by strong congressional action. The Supreme Court,
under Marshall, strengthened national powers against state pretensions and established the Court's role as the pre-eminent interpreter
of the Constitution. Yet, the Court was usually generous toward state
action until the last decade of the nineteenth century, and the Dred
Scott decision4 in 1857, which frustrated congressional efforts to
compromise the slavery issue, marked only the second time the
Court had faulted an act of Congress.
The present century has been marked not only by short-range
ebbing and flowing of executive power, but also by congressional
acceptance of a largely ratifying and checking role in its relationship
with the President.5 The twentieth century clearly is the age of executive initiative and administrative government. The great era of
Congress lies in the past.
To point out that the Supreme Court has also had a checkered
career since the turn of the century is to state the obvious. Over the
protests of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and occasionally others, the
Court read into the Constitution an economic and social philosophy
which made it a frequent and effective censor of state and national
legislation.6 Progressive political leaders increasingly viewed the
Court, which allied itself in spirit with the dominant laissez-faire
philosophy of powerful business leaders, as a barrier against needed
social change. When the forces pressing for large-scale social reform
found a powerful spokesman in Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Court
was brought under siege. Although the President's ill-conceived
Court-packing plan was defeated, the Court, sensing the dangers confronting it, withdrew from its censorious role. The power to govern
was returned to Congress and the President. No longer would the
Court use the tenth amendment to frustrate national commerce and
taxing power.7 Also abandoned was the ready use of the due process
clauses to inhibit state and national social legislation.8
4. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393.
5. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS (4th rev. ed. 1957); J. HAluus,
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATION (1964); R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(1960); N. POWELL, REsl'oNSIBLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITil> STATES (1967).
6. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948); A. l\IASON, THE SUPREME COURT
FROM TAFT TO WARREN (rev. ed. 1968); R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
ch. VI (1960).
7. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
8. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, esp. pt. V (1956); R. l\IcCx.osKEY, supra note 6,
ch. VII; c. PRITcm:rr, Tm: RoosEVELT Coun.T '1948).
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In the period from 1937 to 1953, the Court's role contracted as it
proceeded to undo some of its earlier handiwork, concentrating on
the staples of appellate review. 9 For, even when its role is conceived
in the most modest terms, the Court always has duties of the
highest importance; interpreting and applying the provisions of increasingly complex congressional enactments, review•ng decisions of
myriad federal agencies, and resolving clashes of state and national
power still leave the Court, in James Bradley Thayer's phrase, "a
great and stately jurisdiction." 10 But the post-1937 Court did not
wholly abandon its role as censor. Other potentially explosive areas
of judicial concern had emerged even before the Court revolution
of 1937. First amendment issues involving the national government
came before the Court as early as 1919,11 and with the Gitlow decision12 in 1925, state actions affecting first amendment freedoms
became amenable to Supreme Court review on the judicially
evolved theory that the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause included freedom of speech and, by implication, the other enumerated rights of the first amendment. In
1931 freedom of press,13 in 1937 freedom of assembly, 14 in 1940 freedom of religion, 15 and in 1947 the religious establishment provision16
were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Since state and
local governments had been far more diligent than the national
government in suppressing dissenters and harassing unpopular minorities, large-scale judicial intervention depended on the manner in
which the Court chose to regard its new opportunities.17
In the celebrated footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 18 Justice Stone suggested-in highly tentative language-that
the Court might properly employ more stringent tests when reviewing legislation or official. action that affected specific first amendment
9. C. PRITCHEIT, CML Lm.ERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 240 (1954), concluded that
"[t]he Vinson Court's solution was almost entirely within the tradition of the strong
legislature-weak judiciary formula which Holmes developed for the quite different
purpose of controlling judicial review over state economic legislation."
IO. The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
Hilv. L. R.Ev. 129, 152 (1893).
11. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
12. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
13. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697.
14. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353.
15. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296.
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1.
17. The opportunities were certain to arise because of the increasing public and
legal activities of organized groups in the 1930's. See generally R. H0llN, GROUPS AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1956).
18. 304 U.S. 144, 1.52 (1938).
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rights, restricted normal political processes, or focused upon "discrete or insular" minorities.
This conception of a preferred position for certain freedoms was
firmly adopted by some of the Justices, particularly Black, Douglas,
Rutledge, and Murphy, and was followed on occasion by others. In
opposition, Justice Frankfurter, adhering to the teachings of his
Harvard Law School mentor James Bradley Thayer, saw no reason
to concede a preference to the Bill of Rights.19 Reiterating a political philosophy expressed decades earlier, Frankfurter viewed the
Supreme Court as an essentially undemocratic institution, one that
should defer to the decisions of the representative branches on virtually all occasions.20 With the exception of the second John M.
Harlan, no other Justice in the modem era has foreswom judicial
power in such positive terms. Although classed by most observers
with Frankfurter and 'Harlan as "conservatives," Justices Jackson,
Clark, Reed, Minton, Whittaker, White, Stewart, and Chief Justice
Vinson were less impressed with the dangers of judicial intervention; their numerous votes in support of governmental action reflected their conclusion that, on balance, such action was reasonable.
Yet during the period from 1937 to 1953, there were three constitutional areas in which the Court demonstrated particular interest, and in many cases, invalidated governmental action. Jehovah's
Witnesses won a number of triumphs, most notably in the second
19. Speaking of the preferred-position concept, he argued that it was "a mfochie,·ons phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law
touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity." Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949).
20. Justice Frankfurther's majority opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitho,
310 U.S. 586 (1940), and his dissent in West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) are excellent examples of his antireview attitude. Arthur E.
Sutherland suggests that between 1938 and 1943 a profound change in our political
philosophy may have occurred, a revision of thought about majoritarian institutio 1s.
All Sides of the Question, Felix Frankfurter and Personal Freedom in 2 FELIX
FRA;-.;KFURTER: THE JUDGE 109 (W. Mendelson, ed. 1964). If this insight is correct, it h
clear that Frankfurter remained a true believer to the end. Clearly the Justice ha~ a
romantic and rather elementary conception of the role of _our representative institu•
tions and the nature of their functioning, which seems surprising in one who was
so close to the seats of power in the 1930's. But perhaps that experience served to rein•
force his bias against judicial review, since Frankfurter's principal position was tl>at in
a world of relative values the legislature was at least more representative than thc,
Court. Frankfurter had written in 1934, "[T]he process of co!'stitutional interpretatio:i
compels the translation of policy into judgment, and the controlling conceptions of
the Justices are their 'idealized political picture' of the existing social order.'' Th:
Supreme Court of the United States, in XIV E::-:CYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCL\L ScIE::cE:;
424 (1934), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: FELIX FMNKFt:RTER 21, 30 (E. Pricha1c. 8:
A. Macleish ed. 1939). Apparently he had little respect for _the argum<:Tit that Su:?rcrn~
Court Justices also have a representative role.
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flag salute case.21 The Duncan case,22 invalidating martial rule in
Hawaii during World War II, and Thornhill v. Alabama,23 drawing
peaceful picketing under the protection of free-speech guarantees,
were other libertarian victories. Second, by insisting on a realistic
assessment of the "equality" afforded by "separate but equal" facilities,2t and by stressing the importance of the intangible detriments
flowing from a segregated education,25 th-e pre-·warren Court rendered inevitable the decision in the school desegregation cases.26 Similarly, the pre-Warren Court began in the 1930's to evince interest
in the process of criminal justice in the states. As the Court chose to
look more closely at the realities of criminal justice, it discovered
that racial minorities and indigent and inexperienced defendants
were subject to law enforcement and trial practices that fell short of
due process of law. 27
Despite its new judicial concerns, it is fair to say that the pre·warren Court had slipped into a secondary role in the political
system, and its decisions, on the whole, did not arouse serious public
criticism. The decision in the steel seizure cases28 was popular, primarily because President Truman's standing with the American
people was not high. The decision upholding the convictions of the
Communist Party leaders29 was widely applauded, as were other
decisions supporting actions restricting Communists.30
By 1953, then, when Earl ·warren stepped dovm as Governor
of California to accept a recess appointment from President Eisenhower, the Court was already embarked on new judicial paths. But
the nation, troubled by its thorny relations with the Soviet Union
and frustrated by its seemingly inconclusive involvement in Korea
only five years after the conclusion of a major war, seemed in no
mood to deal forthrigh,tly with the pressing problem of civil rights,
and reacted with some impatience to claims on behalf of political
dissenters. And law enforcement agencies, as well as the public in
general, had traditionally been hostile to more considerate treatment
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

West Virginia Bel. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Duncan v. Kahana.moku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See R. HARRIS, THE QUEST OF
EQUALITY (1960); C. PRITCHEIT, CIVIL LIBERTIES A.VD THE VL',SO:-. COURT ch. 7 (1954).
27. See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFE:-.DA."<,'S RIGHTS (1958).
28. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 T:.S. 579 (1952).
29. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
30. American Communication Assn. v. Douds, 339 TJ.S. 382 (1950); Adler v. Board
of Educ. of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), among others.
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for criminal defendants, whether by overly generous judicial doctrine or the use of legal "technicalities."

II. THE WARREN ERA
President Eisenhower's nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States represented an awareness that the Supreme
Court was, and necessarily remains, a political organ as well as a
court of law. If legal experience and technical skill were prime
requisites for a Justice or Chief Justice, it would have been difficult
to justify the Warren appointment. Apart from discharging a major
political debt, the appointment-concurred in by United States
Attorney General Brownell and presumably by other leaders of the
Eastern wing of the Republican Party-promised to bring to the
Court a mildly liberal leader who could be counted on to play a part
in reinforcing the image of no-nonsense, businesslike government
which the new Administration hoped to maintain.31
In the very first term of Warren's tenure the Court handed down
its opinion in the school desegregation cases,32 which had been before the Court in the last term of Vinson's leadership, onlt to be set
for reargument in the following term. The predictable reaction to
the Court's pronouncement in these cases and to the implementing
decision that followed in 1955,33 despite the Court's unanimity, was
a barrage of violent criticism from political leaders and other spokesmen in the "deep South." More concrete resistance soon followed:
legislative "interposition" resolutions were adopted, and various
laws and administrative measures to thwart, or at least delay, implementation of the Brown decision were enacted. Almost all Southern members of Congress joined in 1956 in issuing a "Declaration of
Constitutional Principles," which concluded with an appeal for resistance by "all lawful means." 34 Other decisions applying the desegregation rule to various activities and facilities further inflamed
Southern sensibilities.
It cannot be overstressed that this violent and persistent attack
on the Court by the political leaders of a substantial section of the
nation has affected public reaction to other important Court decisions. For here was a large, vocal minority eager to discredit the
31. See the account of the appointment in J. "WEAVER, "\VARREN: THE MAN, THE
ch. 13 (1968).
32. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294.
34. The legal resistance is chronicled in various issues of the Race Relations Law
Reporter. See also J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND A?srERICAN LAW (1959).
COURT, THE ERA
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Court in every conceivable way; and, given the range of controversial subjects that inevitably challenged the Court, the opportunities for public denunciation were numerous. · In addition to the
steaming racial issues, the Court had to pass on antiobscenity measures, the rights of criminal defendants, sit-ins and other controversial forms of free expression, prayers and Bible-reading in schools,
and questions involving apportionment and districting for state and
national elections. \'\,'hen decisions favorable to individuals and
groups claiming these rights were handed down, the Southern bloc
could be counted on for bitter comment and intense efforts to inform news media of the disastrous consequences of the Court's chosen
path.35 Because Southern Senators and Representatives held important committee positions as a result of the seniority system, they were
able to use Congress as a forum for their anti-Court crusade. Many
non-Southern members of Congress, whose mood has been one of
frustration arising from running battles with the bureaucracy, constant presidential prodding, and widespread criticism of Congress,
joined in the chorus of denunciation, eager to point the finger of
blame at another institution. It was especially pleasant for Congressmen to assume stances that were certain to please substantial numbers of constituents, and many of the Warren Court's decisions were
unpopular with large segments of the population for reasons that
seem obvious. How many citizens, after endless instruction that
Communism was a great and imminent threat to the nation's security, would applaud a decision favorable to Communists?36 And,
clearly, the number of parents outraged by obscene literature exceeded the number of libertarians who applauded the Court's stand
favoring literary freedom. 37 Citizens who were alarmed by the growing crime rate were also quick to join the chorus of disapproval
generated by law enforcement representatives. Millions of good people were shocked by the decision banning prayers and Bible-reading,
and only a massive counterattack beat off the effort to reverse the
!15. The bitter struggle to curb the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is brilliantly
described in W. MURPHY, Co~GRESS A.'m THE Cot:RT (1962), a work crucial to our
understanding of congressional attitudes in the 1950's and 1960's.
!16. See Stumpf, Congessional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction
of Law and Politics, 14 J. PL"B. L. 3i7 (1965) for a study of Court "reversal" bills in
Congress. See also Lytle, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Decisions in the
Aftermath of the School Segregation Cases, 12 J. PUB. L. 290 (196!1); Hearings on
S. 2646, Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958).
37. See s. KRlsLOV, THE Sl"PRE:\{E COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDO:\{ !19-53 (1968) for an
analysis of the antilibertarian cast of American public opinion.
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Court by means of the Becker Amendment.38 Even the relatively
-popµlar reapportionment decisions aroused militant opponents who
stood to lose by a fairer system of representation.39 And of course,
the cry of "states' rights" was raised not only in response to the
desegregation decisions, but also in opposition to all decisions that
found fault with state laws or practices. When the Conference of
State Chief Justices issued its curiously unjudicial report in 1958/0
ticking off grievances against the United States Supreme Court, it
merely confirmed for many citizens their mm vague fear that in an
increasingly confusing and rapidly changing world, the Supreme
Court seemed determined to render innovative and therefore distressing decisions.
In retrospect, it seems obvious that when the Court chose to
hand down decisions favorable to racial minorities, political dissenters, criminal defendants, and protagonists of unpopular causes, it
could hardly expect cheers from the majority of people. Empirical
studies of popular attitudes consistently reveal deep-rooted popular
opposition to many provisions of the Bill of Rights, and ingrained
hostility toward dissenters and advocates of change.41 Only strong
stands by political and social leaders and by the popular media could
offset this antilibertarian sentiment of the majority, but rarely were
such stands taken. The Congress, as mentioned above, found the
Court a convenient target. President Eisenhower assumed a remarkably dispassionate attitude toward the desegregation decisions, and
withheld the massive reinforcement which the prestige of his name
and office might have provided.42 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were willing to speak out on racial matters, but, in the nature
of politics, they could not be expected to defend the Court on every
38. See Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schcmp on
the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475 (1964). Of course, the simple focused type of
question may yield deceptive results; see the preliminary findings of Murphy &
Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the U1,ited States Supreme Court, 2 L\w & SOCIETY
REv. 357 (1968). Giv::n an open-ended question about the Court concerning their likes
;m;; 4;~iikes, the majority of respondents come up with nothing. Nevertheless, racial
issues and school prayer, and to a lesser but growing degree, criminal-justice matters
did evoke responses from a substantial minority.
39. On the Dirksen Amendment campaign see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION (1968) chs. 15, 16; Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1968).
40. Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations as Affected by Judicial
Decisions.
41. See S. KrusLov, supra note 37.
42. See R. HARRIS, supra note 26, at 155-57. That "you cannot change people's heo.rts
merely by laws," was one of President Eisenhower's cherished beliefs. J. '\VEA\'m'.,
supra note 31, 2.t 217.
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issue.-t 3 The American bar, which furnished heroic support to the
embattled Cour.t of the 1930's, has, on the ·whole, taken a less
sympathetic position toward the Warren Court, which it views as
too controversial and excessively disrespectful toward precedent.
It has often been remarked that the Court should, and usually
does, follow the election returns. The argument is that although the
Court is not an elective body, it must in its mm way behave as a
representative institution. If one takes this argument seriously, the
Warren Court has, perhaps, been wrong on most of the controversial
issues for which it has provided answers. If the function of the Court
is to please the majority and displease as few groups and interests as
possible, then Chief Justice Warren and the other politically sophisticated members of the Court have badly misconceived theh- role
and deserve the criticism that they have received. Bnt there is another
view of the Supreme Court's role that casts the work of the Warren
Court in a more favorable light. If the role of the representative
branches is to give voice to-as well as shape and lead-public
opinion, it may well be the proper function of the Supreme Court
to voice the best aspirations of our people, to give reality to the
ideals we profess in our Constitution and Declaration of Independence, and to provide justice for those who otherwise have difficulty
claiming it. Who can deny that a viable society requires reasonably
prompt and appropriate attention to important social problems? It
is the Court, not the representative branches, which has tried to
eliminate the racial cancer which still threatens America. Only well
after the Court's first efforts did Congress and the President see fit
to act. And, without traversing the ground covered in other Articles
in this Symposium, is it not clear that the dominant theme running
through the other controversial decisions of the ·warren Court is
the necessity of equal rights for all, protection of the underdog, and
respect for the dignity of man in a confusingly complex society? One
can, of course, argue that the "\Varren Court has tried to move
fon\'ard on too many fronts in a period of social change and unrest.
A cautious political strategist might conclude that in the light of the
troubles stirred up by the desegregation decisions, the Court would
have been wiser to allow Bible-readings and prayers in the schools,
avoid restrictions on the police, assist in the crackdown on smut
4!1. President Kennedy's espousal of a comprehensive Chi! Rights Act in 196!1,
enacted into law under President Johnson in 1964, might be regarded as the great
exception. But Congress was driven, not led, to this action in 1964 and to other rights
bills in subsequent years. By 1968 all had returned to normal.
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peddlers, let Communists take their lumps, and stay out of the reapportionment thick.et; but the Court has chosen a more embattled
way.
Writing in 1941, Robert H. Jackson observed that the Supreme
Court was "almost never a really contemporary institution .... The
judiciary is thus the check of a preceding generation on the present
one; a check of conservative legal philosophy upon a dynamic people; and nearly always a check of a rejected regime on the one in
being."44 The mistake of the Warren Court, according to its critics,
is that it insists on moving too fast-on advancing far beyond the
:1.eeds and expectations of the present generation. One of the most
perceptive commentators has warned that the Court should not
i.gnore history "in determining how judicial control should be exercised and when it should be brought to bear." Surely, he admonishes,
''the recora teaches that no useful purpose is served when the judges
seek all the hottest political caldrons of the moment and dive into
the middle of them." 45 It is hardly a daring speculation to suggest
that a post-Warren Court may move somewhat cautiously in the conservative atmosphere of the late 1960's. Yet, the doctrines of equality,
freedom, and respect for human dignity laid down in the numerous
decisions of the Warren Court cannot be warped back to their original dimensions. The attitude of more and more Americans, particularly the members of the young and better-educated generation, is
one of intense commitment to human rights. Generations hence it
may well appear that what is supposedly the most conservative of
American political institutions, the Supreme Court, was the institution that did the most to help the nation adjust to the needs and
demands of a free society.46
44. THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315.
45. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 229 (1960).
46. Archibaid Cox has written:
Only history will know whether the Warren Court has struck the balance right.
For myself, I am confident that historians will write that the trend of decisions
during the I950's and I960's was in keeping with the mainstream of American
history-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental,
a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmaticin short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutiom.
THE WARREN COURT 133-34 (1968).

